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Abstract 
Industrial development has been accompanied by a multitude of social and environmental 
externalities. Often it is social movements who highlight such concerns and put pressure on 
companies to change their practices. One strategy social movements can utilize here is to 
increase a company’s political risk. While the extant literature on political risk has largely 
focussed on national government, we draw attention to the importance of subnational levels 
of government. We discuss specifically how political risk can arise from the processes 
through which a sustainability discourse generated by social movements infuses a local 
community’s sustainability orientation, the generalized manner in which the community deals 
with trade-offs around sustainability issues. Presenting data from two case studies of foreign 
direct investment into the Argentinian mining sector, we show how a strong and coherent 
sustainability orientation can generate substantial political risk at subnational level, 
irrespective of whether similar risk develops at national level. 
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Over the last 200 years industrial development has generated unprecedented wealth at least 
for some humans in some countries; however, it has also been accompanied by a growth of 
social and environmental externalities (Shrivastava, 1995). Many of these issues have been 
taken up by social movements which seek to amplify their concerns through media exposure 
and other means to put pressure on companies to take greater account of their social and 
environmental externalities (den Hond & De Bakker, 2007; Teegen, Doh, & Vachani, 2004). 
In doing so, social movements have several strategies available: in addition to disrupting 
company operations, they can also influencing the perception of company practices held by 
key stakeholders, in other words they can increase a company’s political risk (Bekefi, 
Jenkins, & Kytle, 2006). 
 
Political risk has attracted attention in the management literature for some time now, in 
particular in the context of the operations of multi-national enterprises (MNEs) across a range 
of host countries (see e.g. Fitzpatrick, 1983; Henisz & Zelner, 2005; Kobrin, 1979; Stevens, 
Xie, & Peng, 2016). However, this literature largely focused at the national level; by 
comparison, it is less well understood how political risk can emanate at subnational levels of 
government. Furthermore, the focus of the literature on political risk has been on 
government-business relations, whether these are ownership risks where a host government 
attempts to nationalise a firm or whether these are transfer risks where government 
intervention threatens to interupt the flow of products, capital, people or technology (Keillor, 
Wilkinson, & Owens, 2005; Ring, Lenway, & Govekar, 1990). Only recently has the 
literature honed in on the ways in which social movements can turn concerns over social and 
environmental externalities into political risk for the company (Kobrin, 2009). However, we 
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do not fully understand how sustainability issues can become a source of risk for foreign 
companies and how these processes operate at a sub-national level of government. 
 
To shed more light on this question, we build on insights from the literature on social 
movements. This literature examines how groups form to make claims against political 
institutions as well as businesses (King & Soule, 2007; Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008). We 
build on this literature to enquire how social movements can become a source of political risk 
at subnational level of government. To do so, we utilize the concept of a local community’s 
sustainability orientation, the generalized manner in which a community deals with trade-offs 
between economic, environmental and societal aspects of sustainability issues. Many social 
and environmental externalities are accompanied by a critical discourse that opposes 
unfettered economic activity; however, this discourse generated by various social movements 
often remains ineffective. Whether a social or environmental issue becomes a source of 
political risk seems to hinge on whether the corresponding social movement discourse 
succeeds in forging a strong and coherent local community sustainability orientation.  
 
We develop our argument through data from two cases of FDI projects in the gold mining 
industry of Argentina. In both cases, central government had approved the project, declaring 
both to be beneficial in terms of economic development and to be relatively safe in 
environmental ones. Both projects attracted criticism from grassroots sustainability 
movements over environmental externalities and a perceived lack of local economic 
development opportunities. However, in one case – the mine El Desquite in Esquel in Chubut 
province – the activities by the grassroots movement spawned a strong and coherent 
sustainability orientation in the local community. A local referendum decisively rejected 
mining, and a local magistrate suspended the company’s operations. The suspension was later 
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ratified by local and provincial authorities, causing the company a reported loss of USD 350 
million. In the other case – the mine Bajo de la Alumbrera near Andalgala in the province of 
Catamarca – the sustainability orientation of the local community remained fragmented, 
despite grassroots demands and lawsuits to suspend mining activities. The company 
overcame these criticisms and successfully continued operations with a yearly profit of USD 
500 million. The crucial difference between the two cases hence seems to lie in the ways in 
which the criticial grassroots discourse contributed to a strong and coherent anti-mining 
orientation in one local community but failed to do so in the other. 
 
Building on these two cases, we make a number of contributions to the literature. We 
contribute to a better understanding of a relatively less explored form of political risk, the risk 
of suspension of company activities by subnational levels of governments. We show how the 
ability of social movements to increase political risk for foreign firms hinges on their ability 
to foster a sustainability orientation in a local community that is coherent and strong. When 
such coherence is generated, political risk, produced at local level, can grow to a degree 
where it impacts on corporate strategies and operations, irrespective of whether similar risk 
develops at national level or not. We also draw out implications of our argument for the 
management of political risk. Here we extend the distinction by Hillman and Hitt (1999) 
between three overarching strategies for political action, namely (1) information, (2) 
constituency building and (3) financial incentives, to the management of political risk. 
Although derived from only two cases in one national context, our argument has wider 
implications for understanding political risk more generally.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the literature on 
political risk, social movements and local community sustainability orientation. Thereafter, 
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we introduce the research setting of our study, the Argentinian gold mining industry, 
introduce our two cases and explain our procedures for data collection and analysis. This is 
followed by the presentation of our findings, where we draw out salient factors at subnational 
government level that seem to have driven the differences between the two cases. In the 
discussion section, we tease out the contributions our data can make to the literature, discuss 
lessons for managerial practice as well as commenting on the limitations of the study. Last 
but not least, the conclusions summarize our main arguments. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
 
2.1. Political risk 
 
Simon (1982, p. 68) defines political risk as “governmental or societal actions and policies, 
originating either within or outside the host country, and negatively affecting either a select 
group of, or the majority of, foreign business operations and investments.” Crucially for the 
purposes of this paper, Simon (1982) distinguishing between “governmental or societal 
actions”, i.e. between intervention by the various levels of government and intervention by 
non-governmental actors (see also Jakobsen, 2010). Governmental political risk is often 
classified into two broad categories: (1) ownership and control risks, where the host 
government attempts to change firm ownership or influence managerial control in its favour 
and (2) transfer risks, where government intervention threatens to interupt the flow of 
products, capital, people or technology (Keillor et al., 2005; Ring et al., 1990).  
 
Political risk induced by nongovernmental actors covers a vast range of issues, from public 
demonstrations against a company through trade union demands for employee ownership to 
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political violence or civil disorder (Busse & Hefeker, 2007). Additionally, non-governmental 
risk usually triggers or increases the likelihood of governmental risks, as governments are 
sensitive to changes in social sentiment (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007). Political risk thus 
varies with firm type, where the challenges faced by exporting firms are different from those 
faced by firms with substantial assets abroad (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994). Political risk also 
varies with the institutional context of a country, and different institutional contexts give 
more prominence to certain types and sources of risks. 
 
The literature has predominantly focussed on national government, yet political risk may also 
emanate from subnational levels of government. The multi-layered nature of modern 
government is, in general terms, well understood in the literature (Boddewyn & Brewer, 
1994). There is also a recognition that, while policy making is undertaken by individual 
policy makers or groups, these individuals have their own subjective priorities and may be 
under conflicting pressures from constituency members (Putnam, 1988). Furthermore, the 
policy process is hardly ever undertaken by just the state apparatus; rather, decision-making 
is often the result of attempts by an array of interest groups to influence these decisions 
(Grant, 1995; Rhodes, 2007). Last but not least, most states are embedded in international 
relations and various interstate alliances, which offer additional avenues for influencing 
public policy making at subnational or supranational levels (Richardson, 2000).  
 
At the same time, ‘the government’ often gets treated as a single actor. For example, Busse 
and Hefeker (2007, p. 389) write: “Political risk is related to the risk that a sovereign host 
government will unexpectedly change ‘the rules of the game’ under which businesses 
operate.” The assumption, at least implicitly, is one of “the government” as the sovereign, 
ultimate rule-maker for all activities within its jurisdiction. Gosse and Behrman (1992, p. 95) 
7 
 
make this assupmption explicit. Acknowledging that MNEs often negotiate with subnational 
governmental units, they argue: “Sub-national Governments are not sovereign, so there is 
always an appeal feasible to a higher level”. The literature thus seems to treat subnational 
government in an abbreviated fashion where the notion of the sovereign state with a 
monopoly of coercive power obfuscates a more complex picture as aspects of the state 
monopoly to power are often delegated to supra- or subnational political institutions. This 
situation has led to a call for “a broader, multilevel, and multiactor conceptualization” of 
political risk (Stevens et al., 2016, p. 960).  
 
Managing political risk is particularly important for multinational firms. As governments 
have specific objectives they wish to foster through the operations of MNEs, differences in 
the treatment the firm receives from governments across its various locations may create a 
complex picture (Makhija, 1993). Hillman and Hitt (1999) distinguish between three 
overarching strategies firms can use to manage political action, based on differences in the 
underlying resources exchanged, namely (1) information, (2) financial incentives and (3) 
constituency building. Although not specifically designed for this purpose, this typology can 
be extended to the management of political risk. An information strategy seeks to reduce 
political risk for a firm by providing policy makers with specific information regarding the 
benefits of its continued operation in the country and the costs of alternatives. A financial 
incentive strategy seeks to reduce political risk through aligning the incentives of policy 
makers with the interests of the firm, e.g. through financial inducements to the official or to 
their political party. A constituency-building strategy seeks to reduce political risk by 
attempting to garner support for the firm among individual citizens, thus influencing public 




2.2. Social movements and political risk 
 
Social movement theory has its roots in sociology and political science and examines how 
groups of social actors come together to make claims against certain practices of other social 
actors (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Diani (1992, p. 13) defines a “social movement [as] a 
network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or 
organizations, engaged in political or cultural conflict, on the basis of shared collective 
identities”. Social movement theory facilitates the study of process, of the collective 
processes of contestation, framing of meaning and mobilization for alternatives to challenge 
taken-for-granted practices (Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008). Social movement theory with 
its emphasis on bottom-up change through emergent collective action thus provides a 
complement to the focus in organization studies on hierarchy, formally assigned goals and 
structural mechanisms of control (de Bakker, den Hond, King, & Weber, 2013). 
 
Crucial to the successful operation of a social movement are two capabilities. On the one 
hand, they need to be able to mobilize external resources for action from their supporters, 
such as money, time or expertise (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). On the other hand, their success 
depends on their ability to develop broader systems of meaning to contest existing 
arrangements and to offer new visions that provide coherence to otherwise unconnected 
protest events (Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008). Social movements originally made claims 
against political systems of authority (King & Soule, 2007; Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008). 
Following the rise of large corporations to prominence not only in economic but also in 
political terms (Vogel, 2010), other systems of authority – not least multinational 
corporations – have also become targets for social movement actors seeking to alter societal 
conditions and creating alternative governance structures (de Bakker et al., 2013). Another 
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arena where social movements seek to influence company decision-making is the latter’s 
engagement in corporate social responsibility (CSR). Here social movements seek to position 
themselves as watchdogs over corporate social activities, as guardians of consumer or 
employee interests or as partners in joint projects, thus taking an active role in defining and 
guiding the responsibilities of firms (Teegen et al., 2004). 
 
In addition to bilateral NGO-company interaction, there are also more complex forms of 
interaction. For example, Kraemer, Whiteman and Banerjee (2013) examine resistance 
against plans by Vedanta Resources to open a bauxite mine on tribal land in the Niyamgiri 
mountain range in India. They detail the operations of various coalitions of social movements 
at local, national and transnational levels; yet the event that decisively stopped Vendata’s 
plans was the decision by the Indian Ministry of Environment and Forests to revoke the ‘in 
principle’ environmental clearance it had granted the company for the proposed mine. As de 
Bakker and colleagues summarize the current state of the literature: although many studies 
“attest of the ability of movement activists and civil society entrepreneurs to influence 
powerful firms, in many other cases forcing corporations to change their behaviour through 
non-state channels has proven difficult” (de Bakker et al., 2013, p. 578). 
 
2.3. Community sustainability orientation 
 
In order to examine how social movements can become a source of political risk at 
subnational level, we introduce the concept of a local community’s sustainability orientation. 
Initially, sustainability orientation has been used as a psychological construct that captures 
the extent to which an individual is “concerned with environmental and societal issues” 
(Kuckertz & Wagner, 2010, p. 524). It is an extension of a social value orientation, which is 
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typically defined in terms of the importance an individual attaches to outcomes in a situation 
of social interdependence that are beneficial to themselves versus those that are beneficial to 
others (Cameron, Brown, & Chapman, 1998; Joireman, Lasane, Bennett, Richards, & 
Solaimani, 2001). In such situations, individuals tend to fall into one of three categories: 
prosocials are those who maximize joint gain, individualists are those who maximize their 
own gain and competitors are those who maximize their relative advantage over others 
(McClintock, 1978).  
 
In addition to the individual level (Calic & Mosakowski, 2016; Kuckertz & Wagner, 2010), 
the concept has also been utilized at a supra-individual level. For example, Agyeman and 
Evans (2004) apply sustainability orientation to social movements to explore the ideological 
differences between environmental protection and environmental justice movements. For 
Roxas and Coetzer (2012, p. 464) an environmental sustainability orientation operates at the 
level of the firm and is defined as “the overall proactive strategic stance of firms towards the 
integration of environmental concerns and practices into their strategic, tactical and 
operational activities” (see also Arnold, 2015). 
 
We follow such conceptualizations of sustainability orientation at the supra-individual level 
and conceive of it as operating at the level of a local community. We define a local 
community sustainability orientation as the generalised manner in which the community 
deals with trade-offs between economic activities and environmental and societal issues. This 
definition allows us to hone in on how different local communities weigh different aspects of 
sustainability and how they deal with trade-offs and tensions between those (Hahn, Pinkse, 
Preuss, & Figge, 2015). A community’s sustainability orientation is likely to be informed by 
(pro-environmental and other) social movements, yet we see movements and communities as 
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distinct entities. In particular, there is no automatism concerning the impact of movements on 
communities. As Khan, Munir and Willmott (2007) show, the transnational movement to end 
child labour in the football industry in Pakistan was outwardly successful in stopping child 
labour but ultimately plunged football making families into deeper poverty. At same time, a 
focus on local communities allows us to examine how activities by social movements – 
through influencing the sustainability orientation of local communities – are linked to 
political risk.  
 
3. Research methods 
 
Since the implications of subnational levels of government for the political risk of firms are 
still not fully understood, we employed the case method for this paper. Case research allows a 
comprehensive understanding of the complexity of phenomena and lends itself to exploratory 
investigations when phenomena are still insufficiently understood (Bansal & Corley, 2012; 
Eisenhardt, 1989). As we wanted to contribute to a better understanding of the conditions 
under which subnational government would become a source of political risk, we selected 
two high-profile cases of FDI in the Argentinian gold mining industry.  
 
3.1. Research setting 
 
We chose mining because the industry has characteristics that set it apart from other sectors, 
whether manufacturing or services. Most importantly, the critical resources it needs are tied 
to a particular geographic location. Hence companies in the industry cannot play off countries 
or provinces against each other to generate more favourable conditions. It is not surprising 
then that the industry is one of the sectors that is particularly prone to political risk (Jakobsen, 
12 
 
2010; Makhija, 1993). The extractive industry also requires high levels of investment in the 
prospection and exploration phases before governments grant permit to start exploitation, 
hightening  the importance of political risks before the start of operations.   
 
We selected Argentina because the country possesses rich reserves of mineral resources 
(Mutti, Yakovleva, Vazquez-Brust, & Di Marco, 2012). Since 1995, the country has attracted 
large-sale FDI inflows in mineral exploration and exploitation. In the period 2000 to 2015, 
Argentina received over USD 3.8bn of foreign investment into mining (Secretaria de Mineria, 
2016). The Argentian mining sector is highly internationalised, as 85% of the production is 
controlled by foreign multinationals, chiefly Canadian, Australian, British and Swiss firms. 
The mining industry employs some 80,700 people and provides employment opportunities 
for 316,000 people directly and indirectly. However, the industry has also come under 
criticism from anti-mining movements over its social and environmental externalities. 
Following public protest against large-scale mining projects, more than half of the country’s 
mineral-rich provinces banned metal mining activities on their territories and some very large 
mining projects were put on hold.1 
 
It is important to stress in this context that Argentina has a federal political system. The 
national government is the sovereign rule maker – but only in those aspects explicitly 
delegated to it by the 23 provinces, such as foreign policy. At the same time, each province is 
the absolute sovereign within its own territory. The provinces are thus charged with the 
application of national legislation, but they also create their own legislation. With regard to 
mining, the national government legislates on the conditions under which foreign investment 
                                                          
1 By 2016 the following provinces still banned open-pit gold mining: Chubut, La Pampa, Mendoza, 
Tucuman, Cordoba, Tierra del Fuego and San Luis. 
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is allowed in the mining sector; but it is the provinces who own underground resources, and 
they are sovereign to decide whether or not to exploit these. At national level, the main piece 
of legislation is Law 24.195: Mining Investment. Sanctioned in 1993 during a neoliberal 
government, it aims to attract international investment, e.g. by providing fiscal stability for 30 
years and capping the royalties the provinces can claim of mining companies to three percent 
(Mutti et al., 2012).2 Each province then draws up its own procedures to implement the 
national laws and addresses aspects not regulated by the these. In addition to the national 
government and the 23 provincial governments, the lowest level of government comprises 
municipal authorities which can, for instance, impose fines on polluting companies or deny 
exploration permits. Mining in Argentina is thus carried on in a context of high institutional 
and regulatory heterogeneity, where multiple levels of government and even some informal 
rule-makers co-exist. 
 
3.2. Description of the two cases 
 
We selected two high-profile cases with very different trajectories: ongoing profitable 
operations in one case and abandonement of operations after significant investment in the 
other case. The first case, Bajo de la Alumbrera, is the largest mining project in Argentina. It 
is located 40 km from Andalgala city in Catamarca, a poor province with limited sources of 
employment but with a tradition of metal mining. The project is undertaken by a consortium 
in which Swiss mining giant Xstrata – now merged with fellow Swiss Glencore – owns 50% 
of shares, while two Canadian companies GoldCorp and Yamana Gold own 37.5% and 
                                                          
2 There has been a degree of fluctuation in national government attitudes to mining FDI. Between 
2002 and 2015, Argentina had 3 presidents, all from the Peronist party, namely Eduardo Duhalde 
2002-2003, Nestor Kirchner 2003-2007, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, 2007-2015. As centre-right 
candidate, Duhalde was supportive of mining FDI, whereas Mrs Kirchner adopted a more centre-left 
discourse with anti-foreign business elements. Although important, we treat these shifts in attitude as 
context as both our focal firms are affected by them in the same way. 
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12.5% respectively.3 The project proceeded relatively smoothly during the exploration (1993-
1997), construction and pre-production (1997-2000) phases (WBCSD, 2014). Two years after 
it moved fully into the exploitation phase, local unrest began. Since the operation of the mine 
is highly automatized and requires specialist skills, only 80 of the 200 permanent workers are 
from Andalgala. Most of the population thus perceived a growing divide between the few 
employees and the rest of the inhabitants. In addition, allegations of environmental incidents 
started to emerge in 2001. When in early 2003 two Andalgala residents visited the town of 
Esquel, in the south of Argentina, they learned about the grass-roots anti-mining movement 
there (see the second case) and soon Andalgala too saw anti-mine demonstrations (Misoczky 
& Böhm, 2015). Local residents seemed to increasingly sympathize with the environmental 
arguments of anti-miners – a poll in 2010 revealed that 60% of the population in Catamarca 
opposed new mining investment – but the anti-mining movement never generated the 
momentum it reached elsewhere in Argentina. From 2003 to date, grassroots movements 
have applied strategies that worked successfully in other parts of the country, including road 
blocks, media exposure, lawsuits, intimidation of miners and smear campaigns (Machado-
Araoz, 2009). However, Bajo de la Alumbrera continued operations with an average yearly 
profit of U$ 500 million (Bajo de la Alumbrera, 2014).  
 
The other case, El Desquite, is located near Esquel in Chubut province. Chubut is a wealthy 
province with well-developed tourism and agriculture sectors and no mining tradition. 
Following a minor gold discovery in 1996, a major gold deposit was discovered in 1999. In 
2002, El Desquite was acquired from the exploration consortium by American firm Meridian 
Gold. Expectations were again high, since Esquel had almost 25% unemployment following 
                                                          
3 Ownership of the company operating the mine went through a series of consolidations, culminating 
in the buy-out of prior owners by the present consortium members in 2003. 
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the financial crisis of 2001. The company itself kept a low-profile in terms of media exposure 
and was reluctant to discuss technologies or impacts (BSR, 2003). In July 2002 two 
chemistry teachers saw a notice in a local newspaper announcing a public hearing for the 
transportation of hazardous substances, as are required in such cases by Argentinean 
legislation. At the hearing they learnt that DuPont would be supplying Meridian Gold with 
180 tons of cyanide per month (BSR, 2003). The teachers also managed to obtain a copy of 
the Environmental Impact Assessment for the mine and asked the regulator, the Direction of 
Mines, to postpone the public hearing until the community could have assessed the EIA. The 
request was declined on the grounds that lay persons would not be able to understand the 
content of such a technical document. This answer triggered a spontaneous gathering of 600 
residents in September that resulted in the creation of the Asociacion Vecinos 
Autoconvocados, a leaderless grassroots organization. By November it had become 
Autoconvocados por el No and argued that the only way forward was to reject unequivocally 
the mining project. The movement gathered support from experts in Buenos Aires and local 
economic actors whose interests would be threatened by the mine, such as tourism operators. 
By February 2003, growing resistance forced the local authorities to authorise a public 
referendum concerning mining at El Desquite. The provincial government campaigned with 
Meridian Gold for ‘Si’ (Yes), portraying ‘No’ supporters as technically ignorant and 
misinformed. On 23 March 2003, 82% of the population voted ‘No the Mine’. Amidst 
increasing social unrest, a local magistrate paralysed all further work on the mine site. The 
incumbent governor lost the next elections and the new governor – who had supported the 
‘No’ campaign – suspended the company’s license on a technicality. This was followed by a 
ban of open pit mining in the province of Chubut by Provincial Law 5001. At the end of 2003 
the company stopped working on the project. It wrote off the investment as a loss in 2005, yet 
still retains exploitation rights in the area.  
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3.3. Research design 
 
Our research design applies interpretive theory-building (Eisenhardt, 1989; Gioia & Pitre, 
1990). Its goal is to improve the understanding of phenomena, developing narratives, insights 
and explanations of events “so that the system of interpretations and meaning, and the 
structuring and organizing processes, are revealed” (Gioia & Pitre, 1990, p. 590). Interpretive 
analysis is based on induction; existing theory about relations between concepts is considered 
late in the process of analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989). Interpretive analysis is iterative and non-
linear with data collection and data analysis processes being intertwined. Tentative 
conjectures are confirmed or disconfirmed by further consultation with respondents or re-
coding of data (Gioia & Pitre, 1990).  
 
The research design started with informal interviews and meetings with mining companies 
and policy-makers. Respondents consistently mentioned Esquel and Andalgala as 
paradigmatic cases. Inductive methodology recommends taking measures to prevent 
emerging theories from being biased towards existing theories, particularly during data 
collection stages (Gioia & Pitre, 1990). To account for this, data was collected and initial 
conjectures built without any particular theoretical leaning. An initial round of coding 
identified Sustainability orientation, Conflict over distribution of risks and benefits and 
Behaviour of multinational companies as dominant themes emerging from the data. One 
researcher who was external to the data collection team was brought in at a later stage to 
integrate existing theory in the process of interpretive theory building. This researcher 
provided three coding schemes drawing on the literature on political risk and other literatures 
related to themes originally conjectured: Sustainability orientation, Governmental and 
nongovernmental political risk and Corporate Behaviour (which evolved into Corporate 
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Management of Risk). The original team of coders used these theory-based coding schemes 
to re-analyse the  data, identifying  main concepts and relationships emerging from the new 
code schemes. The concepts and structural linkages derived from the literature were thus only 
integrated after interpretive theory building had lead to a series of findings. A last round of 
analysis looked for confirmation of the linkages constructed between emerging explanations 
and existing theory. All the above methodological steps follow closely Gioia and Pitre (1990) 
and Eisenhardt (1989).  
 
3.4. Data collection 
 
Data for the two cases were generated in stages through three types of sources: (a) 69 semi-
structured interviews conducted between 2008 and 2010 in Buenos Aires, Catamarca, 
Chubut, Rio Negro, Tucuman and Santa Fe, (b) participation in public meetings, audits and 
workshops between 2008 and 2015 and (c) secondary data, such as newspapers, sustainability 
reports or environmental audits. The interviews were conducted with key stakeholders of the 
Argentine mining sector: major mining MNEs operating in Argentina; domestic mining 
companies; officials of national, provincial and local government; members of local 
community groups and others. Initial interviewees were approached after being identified as 
major stakeholders of the sector in a review of the secondary literature, while subsequent 
interviewees were approached using a snow-balling technique. The interviews lasted between 
45 and 120 minutes, seven key interviewees were interviewed more than once.  
 
All interviews were conducted in Spanish by the same two interviewers to achieve 
consistency of data collection. The interviews used a semi-structured format, i.e. respondents 
were asked to give their opinions following a standard interview schedule but were 
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encouraged to elaborate freely. Opening questions to all interviewees were general questions 
aimed to elicit views on sustainability orientation, causes of political risks and corporate 
management of risks and community relations. Depending on the background of each 
interviewee, subsequent questions explored a variety of social and environmental 
externalities, types of political risk, legal and technical aspects of mining operations, the 
influence of the political and institutional context on the development of risks as well as 
strategies applied by firms, government and non-government actors. 
 
3.5. Data analysis 
 
All qualitative sources (interview transcripts and notes) were translated from Spanish into 
English and then coded in different stages using axial and open coding techniques in the 
NVivo software. The node named political risk was created collecting data with content 
relating to governmental and nongovernmental risks at the subnational level. This node was 
created in the last stage of analysis. Since it responded to a consolidated stream of the 
literature, content analysis based on keywords was chosen as coding method. Keywords 
included risks from all the risk forms described in the literature review, i.e. ownership, 
transfer and prohibition of activities. 
 
A second node collected views on the sustainability aspects of mining and social movements, 
including sub-nodes for community sustainability orientation and narratives used by 
grassroots movements. The focus was on the extraction of data discussing, on the one hand, 
externalities and sustainability trade-offs and, on the other hand, data containing references to 
sustainability principles underlying the two sustainability orientations. This node had been 
built in an earlier stage of coding. It was based on transcripts of interviews in their original 
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language and served to approve/disprove initial conjectures on sustainability orientation. 
Rather than using keywords with a retrieval tool, we carried out a qualitative content analysis, 
reading and interpreting all responses. This approach was deemed more adequate since many 
pro-mining respondents avoided explicitly naming an environmental externality. For 
instance, several interviewees referred to the use of cyanide as “the big issue”, “the thing” or 
“their flagship”. An additional advantage of this method is that during the process we could 
classify the data more easily into sub-nodes. All these nuances were carefully explored when 
classifying the data. We also explored the internal cohesion of respondent’s principles and the 
consistency of narratives across different community actors.  
 
Finally, a code named “Managing Risk” was built mapping onto the strategies for political 
activity by Hillman and Hitt (1999) of information, constituency building and financial 
incentives and onto Khanna and Palepu’s (2010) strategies for managing in institutional voids 
in emerging markets. Through the interpretive analysis, the information on the nodes was 
screened to retain only data relating to the case studies of Esquel and Andalgala and to 
separate context information about national level risks from the data related to subnational-





In this section, we present our findings with particular emphasis on three aspects (1) how the 
sustainability orientations in the two communities changed in response to the anti-mining 
discourse generated by critical grassroots movements, (2) how provincial governments 
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responded to these developments and (3) how, in turn, the mining companies adapted their 
strategies. 
 
4.1. Differences in local community sustainability orientation 
 
Catamarca has quite some history of metal mining, although not of the scale of the Bajo de la 
Alumbrera project. When this project started, many residents of Andalgala were well aware 
of the trade-off between economic benefits and social environmental disbenefits mining can 
bring, in particular with regard to human health:  
 
We have had mining for a long time in Catamarca, we all know the risks, everybody 
knows. … the legacy [of mining for metals] are chronic lungs diseases such as 
mucinosis, people working in mining have a life expectancy of 60 years, 10 years less 
than other people. People knew what will happen to them … Communities here live 
in the present, their main concern is to have money to put food on the table and send 
children to school. Long term consequences to health are not a main concern, they are 
fatalist about it… everybody dies sooner or later. 
(Medical worker, Catamarca province, 2009) 
 
The starting point was very different in Esquel, which had no prior experience of mining and 
its social and environmental externalities. Many local residents initially did not have any pre-
existing awareness of the trade-offs between mining and sustainability: 
 
In the beginning, the community thought, since people would be coming to work in 
the mine, more money to spend, all this leading to growth. Employment in Esquel is 
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mainly in services and public administration: police, military, a theatre [now closed], 
but no manufacturing. The city needed an industry to impulse the people. Therefore, 
most of the people were very keen on the mine. In Esquel, there is nothing. 
(Member of local government, Esquel, Chubut province, 2008)  
 
As the mining activities commenced, both locations saw significant activities by anti-mining 
grassroots movements. However, there also were crucial differences between the grassroots 
movements in the two places. In Catamarca, views on how to deal with the trade-offs around 
mining were not cohesive. Some groups aimed to ban mining, often advocating care for 
nature as a matter of principle:   
 
Mining is not sustainable, it does not benefit the community and it will never do.   
Companies take our gold, deplete our water, exploit our people and leave nothing but 
misery as legacy. If you go to a former mining town, what you see is devastation, 
ghost towns, holes filled with poisonous water.   
(Member of grassroots movement, Andalgala, Catamarca province, 2009) 
 
Others advocated drastic changes to regulation in order to increase benefits for local 
communities if not to nationalize foreign companies outright: 
 
Mining has a bad reputation here in Catamarca, state-owned companies were not 
efficient and nobody controlled them. Now, people suffer from hunger in Andalgala, 
we need to make the most of this opportunity. Now we have large multinational 
companies with corporate social responsibility policies and we can have independent 
controls. The authorities have not got the resources to control them, yes I agree…. We 
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should retain part of the profits of mining companies to allow local authorities hire 
independent auditors. 
(Church worker, Andalgala, Catamarca province, 2008) 
 
The effectiveness of the anti-mining grassroots movement in Catamarca was also hampered 
by the fact that it had limited resources to build resistance: 
 
We have to do all the legwork by ourselves, we are all workers, our time is limited. 
The university [of Catamarca] did not help, they are with the company, the local 
authority say we were trouble-makers wanting to make some money out of the 
company, the Provincial Government will not let us see [Alumbrera’s] Environmental 
Impact. Even internet access is a problem here! 
(Member of grassroots movement, Andalgala, Catamarca province, 2008) 
 
By contrast, opinion in Esquel congealed quickly around a mistrust in the mining company 
and its political backers in provincial government. The implications of mining suddenly 
became clear to residents when chemical company DuPont announced a public hearing, as 
required by Argentinean law whenever a company wishes to transport a hazardous substance. 
The fact that residents learned about key aspects of the planned mining development through 
DuPont – rather than the mining company or the provincial government – nurtured the 
perception that neither the company nor the government can be trusted to prioritize 
sustainability and community interests when trade-offs arise: 
 
A DuPont expert came to town to explain health and safety precautions being taken to 
transport the cyanide that was meant to be used to extract gold. Only then we realised 
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that they will dynamite 40,000 tons of rock very day, day-in day-out, for 10 years. 
10,000 tons will be pulverised and put in large pools where the gold would be 
lixiviated with cyanide. The remaining 30,000 tons per day would be dumped back 
into the mountain. The gold stream is in a direct line from the city, only six kilometres 
away. It would have been horrific pollution. 
(Member of grassroots movement, Esquel, Chubut province, 2008). 
 
Distrust grew when the company refused to comment on their use of cyanide, arguing their 
processes were confidential. Refusal by both company and provincial government to discuss 
technical details and to engage with critics of the mine reinforced the perception that 
environmental risks cannot be managed and therefore increased the cohesiveness of the anti-
mining orientation in the local community: 
 
Who was going to control the use of cyanide? I ask you, can you tell me? The 
company, who says that cyanide cannot be discussed because of business 
confidentiality, but says it will all be ok, no worries…? The local authority, which 
would not be able to detect cyanide if they had it spilled in their drinks? The 
governor, who was already counting his share? You know what they [the authorities] 
would have done? They would have asked for some more money and get a pawn to 
write a report and agreed with the industry to introduce some useless CSR code that 
nobody enforces and we would have had spill after spill. 
(Medical worker, Esquel, Chubut province, 2010) 
 
Furthermore, residents of Esquel were well educated and the community had a history of 
defending local public interest against controversial ventures. In the 1980s communities in 
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Chubut had successfully thwarted an attempt to open a nuclear waste site in town of Gastre. 
The community perceived similarities between Gastre and El Desquite. Both projects 
involved significant environmental and health risks. In both cases there was a trade-off 
between short-term economic benefit and exposure to a highly hazardous substance. In both 
cases the government backed the company, playing down risks and emphasising short-term 
benefits. In Gastre, the community won the battle against the nuclear waste project, using 
sustainability arguments. By framing El Desquite as a new Gastre, fears about cyanide 
activated latent community capabilities to generate their own knowledge and to mobilize 
resources: 
 
Esquel was a spectacular place for global activists to start. Esquel is a town of public 
servants and tourist operators with plenty of time in their hands, swathes of educated 
people with boring, unfulfilled lives yearning for a cause to defend, fondly 
remembering their ten minutes of fame in Gastre. Many of them came from Buenos 
Aires looking for nature, the flowers, the lakes. They sat in the town’s hotels and saw 
the cranes on the mountain. 
(Official from provincial government, Buenos Aires, 2009) 
 
Additional key players, such as the Chamber of Tourism and the Chamber of Agricultural 
Producers, also opposed mining. Catholic priests in the city of Esquel did not take sides, but 
the bishop of the province warned that defenceless communities should not be exposed to any 
activity that has not been unequivocally proven to be safe. The provincial government soon 




These findings show how the sustainability orientations of the two communities developed in 
fundamentally different ways. Although residents of Catamarca were well aware of the social 
and environmental implications of new mining projects, the community did not develop a 
cohesive sustainability orientation. Many residents took a fatalistic view of the trade-offs 
around mining and accepted social and environmental damage as part of the status-quo 
because they had a long experience of mining-related diseases and pollution. The grassroots 
movement itself was fragmented in the potential solutions it put forward, from a radical 
perspective that mining would never be sustainable and had to be resisted as a matter of 
principle to a moderate view that the way forward was to focus on generating more benefits 
from mining activities for local communities. The emergence of a coherent sustainability 
orientation was furthermore hampered by the fact that powerful institutions, not least the 
Catholic Church, actually endorsed mining in Catamarca. 
 
By contrast, a cohesive and strong sustainability orientation did emerge in the local 
community of Esquel. This orientation had been latent in the community since the successful 
resistance against the nuclear waste project in the 1980s. However, it was the lack of the 
transparency and resulting trustworthiness of those promoting the mine, which triggered a 
bottom-up “us” versus “them” identification process. Since those empowered to manage the 
trade-offs around mining became seen either incapable or not to be trusted, local residents 
became convinced of the impossibility of a deal with trade-offs; in other words, the only 
solution was to reject mining. This position received additional institutional support from key 
local institutions, such as the Chamber of Tourism. Last but not least, the anti-mining 
grassroots movement was well resourced and could position itself as successor to those who 
had fought against the nuclear waste site in the 1980s. The community orientation in Esquel 
thus centred around three sustainability principles: subsidiarity (people cannot leave 
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important decisions to power holders in government or business), non-commoditization of the 
environment (based on the precautionary principle) and distributive justice. These three were 
consistently mentioned by grassroots activists, the media, educators, the church and other 
stakeholders. By contrast, in Catamarca only the principle of distributive justice appears 
consistently across community groups. 
 
4.2. Differences in subnational government responses 
 
The sustainability orientation of a local communities does, of course, not automatically 
translate into political decisions. Rather these depend on how decision-makers interpret the 
strength and cohesion of the orientation and weigh it against other factors, such as the 
interests of other interested parties. For instance, one such concern for policy makers in 
Andalgala is weighing the economic contribution of mining to the provincial budget against 
environmental costs: 
 
The mining industry provides 70% of their takings and so, whether they like it or not, 
they’re going to support it and that’s why they have become ever more exasperated 
with regards to environmental issues. Because they know that it is an area that 
requires great care. 
(Senior manager of mining company A, Buenos Aires, 2008) 
 
By contrast, Esquel is located in a fertile valley near the Andes range. It is predominantly 
inhabited by a well-educated community with middle to high income inhabitants. Esquel’s 
economy consists of companies operating in services, health care, banking, tourism as well as 
public administration. The tourism sector in the area is strong and centres on a natural 
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landscape that includes a national park and several areas of outstanding beauty. Furthermore, 
the proposed mining project would have competed with agriculture and farming for the use of 
water.  
 
Differences in political risk also emanate from differences in the political situation in the two 
provinces. Catamarca had a much higher degree of political stability during the period of 
interest, as the governor and local authorities had not changed since contract negotiations 
with the mining consortium began. Not only were provincial and local leaders skilled 
negotiators with knowledge of the mining sector, they were also very popular. In other words, 
they did not need to use anti-mining sentiments to win political support. On the contrary, they 
seem to be able to use their position in a relatively stable political situation to negotiate with 
mining companies behind the scenes: 
 
The state is interested in keeping mining, promoting it, whilst keeping people 
dependent on mining, a lot of people are below the poverty line…. We know that the 
municipality needs us to keep milking the company. We are an important 
“opposition” to the municipality “controlling” the situation in the eyes of the 
company. 
(Members of grassroots movement, Andalgala, Catamarca province, 2008) 
 
A completely different picture emerged at Esquel in Chubut province. The province was 
gearing up to elections when the dispute over the mine broke out. The governor and the local 
authorities belonged to different political parties and hence could not join efforts to support 
mining. Neither the governor nor the lord major had any knowledge of the mining sector. 
Moreover, the governor’s political power had been greatly affected by the economic crisis. 
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Mining thus became an unpopular cause defended by an unpopular governor. As social 
resistance became widespread, supporters of mining had a political disadvantage. The local 
government shifted allegiances and supported the anti-mining camp. The provincial 
government stuck to defending mining and was defeated by a challenger who build his 
campaign on the slogan “No a La Mina”. 
 
All the build-up to the referendum in Esquel, where the local authority was Peronist 
and the governor radical, therefore political adversaries, did not look good. If one of 
them supported mining, the other had to oppose it. 
(Senior official from national government, Buenos Aires, 2008) 
 
When an anti-mining sentiment becomes part of a coherent and strong sustainability 
orientation, the danger of political risk for mining companies increases exponentially. 
However, whether that risk actually materialises, i.e. whether subnational governments 
indeed act on such pressure seems to depend on a number of additional factors, not least the 
contribution of mining to the provincial economy. The provincial government of Catamarca 
depended on mining both in terms of the industry’s contribution to regional economic 
development and to the governmental budget. Given its healthier economic structure, no such 
pressure existed in Esquel. Furthermore, the government of Catamarca actually held a share 
in the mining consortium, whereas no such structural constraints on political action existed 
for Esquel. A further reason, why anti-mining concerns in Catamarca did not translate into 
political risk stems from the greater political stability in the province. It was not scheduled to 
have elections during the period in question and both provincial and local governmental 
leaders had extensive experience of negotiating with mining companies and hence were 
trusted by the community to represent its interests. In Esquel, however, the upcoming 
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provincial election provided an opportunity for the opposition to rally around the anti-mining 
movement to oust an already unpopular governor. 
 
4.3. Differences in company responses 
 
Another factor that can mitigate how and to what extent the sustainability orientation of a 
local communities translates into political risk are the ways in which companies engage with 
community concerns. Here too significant difference emerged our two cases. In Andalgala, 
Bajo de la Alumbrera engaged in a range of CSR initiatives. Initially it focussed on 
supporting small entrepreneurs in the agricultural and services sectors, promoting gender 
equality through their recruitment and supplier selection policies or mentoring local 
companies to become suppliers. When anti-mining sentiments began to be voiced in 
Catamarca, the company stepped up its CSR engagement and built infrastructure in response 
to requests by the local authority, increased the number of contracts with local suppliers and 
started engaging local teachers and students in community support projects. 
 
We also work in education on environmental issues, because undoubtedly, one of the 
branches is a project to review the mine’s environmental conduct. Within this we 
must educate and teach people that we are credible. It is not about going up to people 
and saying that we are good, but about people from the university or an international 
body explaining what the mining industry is all about, and trying to improve training 
so that people understand what they are being explained. 




From the moment the project was announced, the company responded to public hearings by 
communicating expected developmental gains, it openly discussed the technologies to be 
used during the exploitation phase. It also extensively communicated its good deeds through 
local bulletins, adverts in local media and corporate reports. The company also appointed a 
community relations officer in Andalgala, who proved essential in developing links with 
community leaders. For example, when the anti-mining sentiments began to grow in 
Catamarca, the community officer reported this perceived shift in community sentiment to 
senior management so that the company could step up its CSR engagement. Last but not 
least, the company also developed a mine closure strategy jointly with the community early 
on. This was a critical point at the time since several mines in the North of Argentina had 
finished extraction and left behind hazardous waste and a population deprived of its main 
source of employment.  
 
Again, things went very differently in Esquel. From the start, the company kept a low-profile 
in terms of media exposure, it did not appoint a spokesperson until this was specifically 
demanded by the provincial authorities, it rejected requests to talk about CSR or community 
development and was reluctant to discuss technologies or impacts. Even when a public 
hearing was announced, at which the environmental impact assessment for the mine would be 
presented, it was the provincial regulator, the Direction of Mines, and not the company itself, 
which organized a series of hearings to provide information about the mine. The company 
referred to mine closure and environmental impacts only by saying that these would be dealt 
with following applicable legislation and industry standards. Attendants of the hearings were 
disappointed; in the words of one of the participant, “they talked as if it was a shareholders’ 
meeting, they talked about profits, minimising costs”. Only after the referendum did Meridian 
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Gold hire a CSR consultant to understand why they had lost the referendum. By this stage, 
however, it was too late to attempt to change community views.  
 
These findings once more show that a coherent and strong sustainability orientation does not 
automatically translate into political risk; rather the skills and transparency with which a 
company approaches its critics play a vital role too. Bajo de la Alumbrera consistently 
provided information to all parties concerning the impacts of and expected gains from its 
mining operations. A particularly important role here was played by its CEO, who was 
personally involved in CSR and community investment strategies and by its community 
relations officer, who was able to build a bridge between the commercial and technical logic 
prevailing inside the company and the sustainability orientation of the local community. 
Furthermore, the company showed flexibility in the size and goals of its CSR initiatives. 
Although Xstrata, as the lead firm in the consortium, initially stated that it did not want to get 
involved in the construction of schools or roads as it considered this type of infrastructure 
investment to be the responsibility of subnational governments, it later stepped up its 
engagement in these areas. By contrast, Meridian Gold in Esquel pursued a marked different 
strategy. It did not provide any information about CSR or community development; 
important community concerns, such as environmental impacts and mine closure strategy 
were given short shrift. By being reluctant to discuss key implications of its proposed project, 










This paper started with the observation that the literature on political risk has tended to focus 
on risk emanating from national government; whereas subnational levels of government have 
not yet received the same level of scholarly attention. Building on the literature on social 
movements, we showed how social movements can become a source of political risk if the 
discourse over externalities of economic activities they generate resonates with the 
sustainability orientation of a local community. Under conditions of such alignment, political 
risk, produced at subnational level, can grow to a degree where it impacts on corporate 
strategies and operations, irrespective of whether similar risk has developed at national level 
or not. However, as our cases have shown, a strong and coherent sustainability orientation of 
a local community does not automatically lead to political risk; rather, this process depends 
on a number of factors. In our cases, the most salient factors to explain whether a strong and 
coherent sustainability orientation develops in a community and then becomes a source of 
political risk were (see Figure 1):  
 
 the pre-existing orientation in the community. In our cases, the community in 
Catamarca was much more aware of the trade-offs around mining than that of Esquel, 
which had not had any exposure to mining up to that point. 
 the level of skills and resources of the social movement agitating against a company 
or industry. Given a more favourable socio-economic situation and a past of 
successful activism, the anti-mining movement in Esquel was much more skilled and 
better resourced than the one in Catamarca. 
 the ability of the social movement to produce a discourse the local community can 
identify with. In Esquel, the anti-mining movement authored a discourse that bore 
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many of the hallmarks of strong sustainability, such as an emphasis on subsidiary 
action, distributive justice and non-commoditization of the environment based on the 
precautionary principle. In Catamarca, the anti-mining movement did not manage to 
generate such a powerful discourse. 
 support from other powerful societal actors. In the case of Esquel, the governor and 
the local authorities belonged to different political parties and hence could not join 
efforts to support mining. Catamarca had a much higher degree of political stability 
during the period of interest, as the governor and local authorities had not changed 
since contract negotiations with the mining consortium began; neither had they any 
need to use anti-mining sentiments as an electoral tool to win political support. 
 the political skills of the company at the centre of the controversy. In our cases, the 
consortium operating Bajo de la Alumbrera was very skilful in communicating with 
the local community and engaged in CSR activities, whereas the consortium operating 
El Desquite saw no such need. 
 
[insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Many of these mechanisms have been shown to operate at national level. For example, 
Bonardi and Keim (2005) have shown how information on food safety and quality, skilfully 
disseminated by European NGOs, such as ATTAC, Greenpeace or Friends of the Earth, led 
to mounting pressure on European politicians to block genetically modified food marketed by 
US firms. Marquis and Qian (2013, p. 141) study CSR by Chinese firms and identify 
engagement in CSR initiatives as “an important and insufficiently studied mechanism of 
corporate … adherence to government signals on politically legitimate behavior.” We add to 
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these studies the insight that these mechanisms can also operate at subnational level and can 
do so independently from what happens at national level. 
 
The literature on social movements had stressed how their success depends on their ability to 
develop broader systems of meaning to contest existing arrangements and to offer new 
visions that provide coherence to otherwise unconnected protest events (Schneiberg & 
Lounsbury, 2008). The concept of sustainability orientation seems to have explanatory power 
here. As our cases have shown, where social movement discourse become woven into a 
strong and coherent sustainability orientation, it can indeed become source of substantial 
governmental political risk, in addition to nongovernmental political risk in the form 
demonstrations, protests, road blocks, etc. In other words, social movements can position 
themselves as gatekeepers, defining what investments are acceptable and under what 
conditions. 
 
Our study also contributes to the ongoing discussion over the obsolescing bargain mechanism 
(Vernon, 1971). This concept suggests that the bargaining power of an MNE is at its peak just 
prior to the investment, when the host government needs access to its capabilities. Once 
committed, that investment becomes ‘sunk’ capital; the host government may then attempt to 
redistribute the gains from the investment in favour of its constituent groups (Boddewyn & 
Brewer, 1994; Doh & Ramamurti, 2003). According to this logic, the bargaining power of 
Xstrata and Meridian Gold should have been greatest during the pre-production stage. Yet 
our case in Esquel shows that during that stage the company was actually exposed to greater 
political risk, in particular at the subnational level. In Catamarca, once Bajo de la Alumbrera 
went into full operation, the company should have entered a phase of bargaining 
obsolescence. However, the provincial government does not seem to have attempted to 
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renegotiate conditions; it did not even do so when the anti-mining movement arrived in 
Catamarca. Our focus on the alignment between social movement discourse and community 
sustainability orientation can help to explain this constellation. In Esquel, the coherent 
community orientation increasingly congealed around principles of strong sustainability, in 
particular the belief that the disbenefits of the proposed project are so grave that 
contemplating potential trade-offs would be meaningless. In Catamarca, the fragmented 
community orientation centred on distributive justice, which could be addressed by the 
company through its CSR measures. Contrary to the emphasis in the political risk literature 
on a firms’ bargaining obsolescence after it started full operations in a foreign country, our 
findings suggest that – at least for the mining industry – subnational level risk in communities 
with a strong and coherent sustainability orientation will peak before the company starts 
operating.  
 
Our study has a number of limitations. For a start, it is based on a single country and on two 
cases within that country. While having allowed us to generate useful insights, the 
transferability of the findings to other nations, and perhaps even to other locations within 
Argentina, may be limited. Secondly, there is a great degree of heterogeneity in the mining 
industry, where MNEs compete with smaller domestic firms and a significant amount of 
mining is also undertaken by artisan miners. Having focussed on large MNEs, the 
transferability of results may again be impaired. Relatedly, mining projects go through 
several broad stages: (1) prospection, (2) exploration, (3) construction, (4) exploitation and 
(5) closure. El Desquite was in its exploration stage, whereas Bajo de la Alumbrera had 
reached the exploitation one; the two projects were in different stages of their development. 
Thirdly, due to the study’s explorational focus, we were not able to measure the effectiveness 




These limitations open up a number of avenues for future research into political risk at 
subnational levels of government. Given that we researched a country with a federal political 
structure, future research could thus investigate political risk across countries with different 
political systems, comparing for example federal with unitary countries. Argentina’s 
neighbour Chile could be a starting point here, as Chile has a century-long tradition of mining 
and is a unitary country with a much stronger role played by the national government. 
Secondly, future research could investigate subnational political risk in different industries. 
Even within mining, there would be scope to hone in on differences between companies at 
the different stages of the mining project. Last but not least, the effectiveness of the described 





This paper took its starting points from two recent developments, empirically from the 
observation that political risk remains a serious challenge for international business (Henisz 
& Zelner, 2005; Jakobsen, 2010) and theoretically from the argument that the study of 
political risk needs to evolve towards “a broader, multilevel, and multiactor 
conceptualization” (Stevens et al., 2016, p. 960). We heeded this call by drawing attention to 
the subnational level of government as a potential source of political risk. Specifically, we 
honed in on the role of a local community’s sustainability orientation, the generalized manner 
in which a community deals with trade-offs between economic, environmental and societal 
aspects of sustainability issues. We used data from two cases of FDI in the gold mining 
industry in Argentina to show that a strong and coherent community sustainability orientation 
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– fed, but not determined, by social movement discourse – can indeed lead to substantial 
governmental political risk, in addition to whatever nongovernmental political risk the social 
movement itself manages to generate. Social movements thus can position themselves as 
gatekeepers and define what investments are acceptable and under what conditions. These 
processes at subnational level seem to operate independently from whatever happens at 
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Figure 1: The relationship between social movements, local community sustainability orientation and political risk 
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